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ABSTRACT
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Under the Supervision of Professor Edward Hinchman

A prominent line of thought owed originally to the work of Harry Frankfurt is that it is our
identifying, in a certain technical sense, with our mental states which makes these states and the
actions which emerge from them our own in a way distinctive of agents. Separately, moral
attributability, a sort of responsibility located first by T. M. Scanlon, has recently attracted the
attention of many philosophers. In this paper I will argue that we ought to aim to adopt theories
of identification and moral attributability such that our capacity for the sort of agency involved in
identification is a precondition for our capacity to have mental states attributable to us.
Motivated by this point and the prominent line of thought that we identify through our cares, I
will develop an account of moral attributability through caring, for which I argue it is plausible
such an explanatory relationship can exist between our capacities for identification and
attributability.

ii

© Copyright by Thomas Yamilkoski, 2018
All Rights Reserved

iii

For both the family with me today and the family who have passed on before me.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.1: Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1
2.1: Historical Motivation for Modern Reductive Accounts of Freedom of Action ...................... 4
2.2: Modern Accounts of Freedom through Identification ............................................................. 7
3.1: Moral Attributability ............................................................................................................. 17
3.2: Attributability: Smith's Rational Relations View .................................................................. 21
3.3: Motivating a Care-based Approach to Attributability Further: The Prototype Account ....... 24
3.4: Attributability as Sensitivity to Norms of Care-Constitutive Desires ................................... 28
3.5: Objections ............................................................................................................................. 33
4.1: Autonomy, Attributability, and Accountability ..................................................................... 36
References .................................................................................................................................... 40

v

1.1: Introduction
Over the course of the last forty-or-so years, a certain literature has developed around
characterizing the difference between mental states and actions which belong to us as persons, or
we have or perform freely, and those which do not really express our characters. This literature
holds that it is our identifying, in a certain technical sense, with our mental states which makes
these states and the actions which they produce truly our own. 1 While various philosophers have
tried different conceptions of identification toward characterizing these phenomena, in recent
work on the subject Frankfurt, Agniezka Jaworska, and David Shoemaker have argued for
accounts of identification which hold, through one mechanism or another, that it is our cares
which allow us to identify with our mental states in this way which allows us to act freely, as
agents.2
Separately, T. M. Scanlon in his "What We Owe Each Other" has located a certain sort of
responsibility, responsibility-as-attributability, around which much literature has developed. 3 On
Scanlon's account of this sort of responsibility, to say that something is attributable to an
individual "is only to say that it is appropriate to take it as a basis of moral appraisal of that
person."4 Since Scanlon put his finger on this notion, much literature has emerged around
characterizing this sort of responsibility and delineating it from others. 5 Two pertinent accounts,

1

See Frankfurt's Free Will and The Concept of a Person. (1971)
See Frankfurt's The Importance of What We Care About, Jaworska's Caring and Internality,
and Shoemaker's Caring, Identification, and Agency. (1982, 2007, and 2003 resp.)
3
Scanlon, 2000.
4
Scanlon, 248.
5
See, for instance, David Shoemaker's Attributability, Answerability and Accountability: Toward
a Wider Theory of Moral Responsibility. (2011)
2
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Scanlon's original proposal and a later account proposed by Angela Smith, attempt to explain the
conditions of attributability, broadly speaking, in terms of norms of judgment. 6
These approaches might be seen to represent two different methods of locating instances
in which an agent is responsible for something: identification concerns whether what belongs to
a person emerges in some correct way from their character, while attributability is interested in
those conditions in which we, in practice, can appraise others as responsible for their actions. As
can be easily demonstrated, however, we simply do, in practice, often hold others responsible in
entirely mundane ways for both mental states and actions which do not emerge from their
character in any way that is required for autonomy. The conditions of identification, in other
words, differ from those of attribution.
One might view this as some sort of disagreement between our intuitions of what it is to
be responsible, but I don't approach the issue this way in this paper. Instead, I attempt to answer
another question, namely: what is the relationship between the things which belong to us as
agents and those that are morally attributable to us? Beyond a vague feeling that there must be
some such relationship, here is an argument that we ought to think there does exist some such
connection: Only of persons can the sort of aretaic appraisal involved in morally attributing
something to someone, one of them as a moral agent, be made. This suggests that the mental
states which qualify somebody as an agent, at least capable of having mental states and acting
freely, should have a significant part in explaining how our mental states and actions can be
attributed to us. That is, given accounts of free agency and responsibility-as-attributability, it
would be a significant theoretical boon for each (and both, taken together) if it were the case that

6

Smith, 2005.
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our capacity for this sort of agential freedom would be able to somehow explain our capacity for
having mental states attributable to us.
Smith and Scanlon's own accounts, again, appeal to judgments and judgment-sensitive
attitudes to explain moral attributability. But while Gary Watson proposed early in the course of
the relevant literature that our identification with motives is a matter of our judging certain
courses of action best, this account failed, and a significant amount of recent literature embracing
the idea that it is instead our cares which make actions and mental states belong to us in this way
crucial to our freedom has emerged. Speaking very broadly, if the attributability of a state to us is
a matter of it having some relationship to our judgements, as Smith and Scanlon hold, it is at best
unclear how we should be able to provide an account of this link between our capacities for
agency and responsibility the above argument makes seem desirable.
In this paper, I motivate and subsequently provide an alternate account of moral
attributability which is complemented in this way by the existing literature on identification-ascaring. What I argue is that the attributability of certain mental states and deficits thereof to us is
a matter of our having care-constitutive desires either for or against taking these mental states.
The truth of any deterministic thesis aside, on this account our responsibility for our actions lies
not in the fact that we are radically free in any libertarian sense, but in the fact that we are
emotionally tethered to other entities7 in the world.
I do not argue that my operative conception of care is capable of characterizing also our
identification with mental states and actions, as this could only be attempted as part of what
would have to be a larger-scale project. It is desirable, as the above argument shows, that we
should have conceptions of identification and attributability which allow us to explain our
7

In the most general sense.
3

capacity for attributability in terms of our capacity for identification. What I hope to show in this
vein is that it is plausible that we should be able to do this, at least for the case of mental states,
through an account of moral attributability as susceptibility to norms of care.
In section 2.1, I provide a summary of the history of accounts of freedom of action which
motivates appealing to the notion of identification under discussion. In section 2.2, I give a brief
survey of modern accounts of identification, including three separate care-based accounts of
identification developed by Frankfurt, Jaworska, and Shoemaker in their respective works. 8 In
section 3.1, I discuss moral attributability and motivate an account of attributability through care
for which our capacity for attributability can be explained through our capacity for agency. In
section 3.2, I discuss and raise objections against a competing account of moral attributability for
mental states fielded by Angela Smith.9 In section 3.3, I propose and reject a prototypical
account of attributability for mental states which suggests it is our higher-order desires which
make certain mental states attributable to us. In section 3.4, I argue that the flaws of the higherorder desire-based account of attributability can be addressed through appeal to instead careconstitutive higher-order desires and provide my operative account of care. In section 3.5, I
discuss two potential objections, and in section 4.1, I return to my claim that our capacity for this
kind of attributability can be accounted for by our capacity for agency and give closing remarks.
2.1: Historical Motivation for Modern Reductive Accounts of Freedom of Action
In Freedom and Action, Roderick Chisholm considers an argument for a compatibilistic theory
of responsibility used by "many philosophers in [the twentieth century], most notably, G. E.

8

See Frankfurt's The Importance of What We Care About, 1982, Jaworska's Caring and
Internality, and Shoemaker's Caring, Identification, and Agency. (1982, 2007, and 2003 resp.)
9
See her Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life. (Smith, 2005)
4

Moore."10 Suppose, as Chisholm does, that one man shot another. If some thesis of determinism
is true, then it will seem to be the case that this individual could not have done otherwise than to
shoot his victim, and the incompatibilist will on the basis of this claim he is not responsible for
the act. What the classical compatibilist argues according to Chisholm is that the expression 'he
could have done otherwise' in this context means only that 'if he had chosen to do otherwise, then
he would have done otherwise.' Supposedly, then, the truth of this second expression is
compatible with determinism, and so the truth first must be as well, their meanings being the
same. Thus the shooter, the classical compatibilist argues, in fact could have done otherwise, and
the incompatibilist's concerns are thus in some way confused. As Chisholm says, what the
incompatibilist will deny of this argument is that is that 'he could have chosen otherwise' is true
in any sense which licenses the inference from the first sentence to the second. If determinism is
true, then our choices themselves will still have their roots in causal chains it is impossible to
track back to any entity that is in a literal, nonreductive way 'us'. Given the truth of a thesis of
determinism, then, it still seems unclear how an individual should ever be able get behind their
actions in any way that they could properly be called responsible for them.
Suppose instead that determinism is untrue, and every event doesn't have a cause. "If the
act... was not caused at all, if it was fortuitous or capricious, happening so to speak "out of the
blue," then presumably no one, and nothing was responsible for the act." 11 To summarize, if
determinism is true, then it is unclear how what seem to us to be our actions are ever more than
the product of causal forces flowing 'through' us. On the other hand, if determinism is untrue and
our actions instead arise without causes, then it is again unclear how we could ever be

10
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Chisholm, 1996, 15.
Chisholm, 16.
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responsible for our acts. So whether our actions emerge as the products of deterministic chains or
they occur without causes, it seems as though we cannot get behind our actions in any way that
could make us responsible for them. 12
The radical solution Chisholm proposes at this impasse to save our responsibility is that
"at least one of the events that are involved in [our acts] is caused, not by any other events, but
by something else instead. And this something else can only be the agent—the man." 13 In other
words, there must exist agents with the capacity for what he calls agent causation, or the ability
to produce events in what we can only take to be a radically free way. As Harry Frankfurt
describes Chisholm's theory, perhaps slightly unfairly, "Whenever a person performs a free
action, according to Chisholm, it's a miracle."14
To be slightly fairer to Chisholm, he does make what I take to be deeply interesting
arguments in defending his appraoch. But many philosophers do not take Chisholm on this
matter seriously,15 and I myself am skeptical of his notion of agent causation. I will however not
be debating Chisholm's point. What is important to understand is that if we are unwilling to
countenance the sort of agent causation which Chisholm proposes then there is a price to pay.
We must accept that the actions we take are merely some combination of the product of causal
forces which in some sense seem to only 'flow through us', or else emerge 'capriciously', without
any order corresponding to that we tend to naïvely think we exercise when we act. The burden

12

The above is adapted from Chisholm, 15-6.
Chisholm, 17.
14
Frankfurt, 1971, 18.
15
As has been remarked by David Velleman in his What Happens When Someone Acts?
(Velleman, 1992, 469)
13
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which falls on us is then to produce a reductive account of our sense that we are agents who are
capable of bringing about changes in the world, consistent with these possibilities
2.2: Modern Accounts of Freedom through Identification
The business of such a reductive account of Chisholm's phenomenon is, then, while accepting
that our actions may have roots in causal chains or else be 'capricious happenings', to delineate
instances in which we might naively regard as persons acting, unimpeded by mere causal forces
or spurious events which might happen to 'flow through' them. Given the nature of this
dichotomy between acts with their roots in mere 'outside' forces and in persons, we might couch
this task in more mundane terms as that of describing when we act freely.
Much literature in the business of explicating this distinction has emerged since
Chisholm's paper, the most seminal of which is likely Frankfurt's Free Will and the Concept of a
Person.16 Frankfurt's language in this paper might initially suggest to us he is interested only in
freedom of the will, as he discusses what he calls 'freedom of action' rather less. In this work,
however, by 'freedom of action' Frankfurt means only "the freedom to do what one wants to
do."17 This is closest to a classical conception of free action, utilized in the argument Chisholm
attributes to classical compatibilists above, and not the more recently developed sense
concerning a fuller notion of autonomy which has come to have an important place in this
literature.

16
17

Frankfurt, 1971.
Frankfurt, 1971, 15.
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What Frankfurt terms 'freedom of the will' in this work is in fact more closely associated
with this fuller conception of autonomous action than what he terms freedom of action. 18 An
important trope in this literature is that of the unwilling addict:
It makes a difference to the unwilling addict, who is a person, which of his conflicting
first-order desires [the desire to shoot up or the desire to not shoot up] win out. Both
desires are his, to be sure; and whether he finally takes the drug or finally succeeds in
refraining from taking it, he acts to satisfy what is in a literal sense his own desire In
either case he does something he himself wants to do, and he does it not because of
some external influence whose aim happens to coincide with his own but because of his
desire to do it. The unwilling addict identifies himself, however, through the secondorder volition, with one rather than the other of his conflicting first-order desires. It is in
virtue of this identification and withdrawal, accomplished through the formation of a
second order volition, that the unwilling addict may meaningfully make the analytically
puzzling statements that the force moving him to take the drug is a force other than his
own, and that it is not of his own free will but rather against his will that this force
moves him to take it.19
We can see Frankfurt's theory as presented in Frankfurt, 1971 as the first which embraces
a technical notion of identification with desires in order to provide accounts of free will and
action.20 Cases in which an agent is identified with a desire and resulting action are most easily
contrasted with that of the unwilling addict, in which we might say a person's 'acts' are produced
by what we would regard as merely by causal forces, which are in some way intruding on how
the agent themself wants to act. Besides the cases such as the above in which we are alienated
from our desires, we also other times simply fail to identify nor be alienated from our desires or
actions, such as when we desire in an idle moment to flick away a speck of dust. In contrast, in
the case that an agent's actions do emerge from desires with which he is identified then we can

18

Although I think this should be uncontroversial, Gary Watson in his Free Will and Free Action
would seem to generally be agreement with me on this matter. (Watson, 1987)
19
Frankfurt, 1971, 13; italics mine.
20
As I hope is clear, I mean free action in the non-classical sense.
8

according to Frankfurt take them to be both willing and acting freely in the fuller but reductive
senses this debate is interested in characterizing.
We might take this notion of identification to apply to mental states more broadly, as
Jaworska does,21 taking it also to locate others sorts of mental states we in a similar sense have
freely, and do not merely 'flow through us'. While I discuss this possibility more later in this
work, much of the literature on identification, including Frankfurt, 1971, is interested only in
identification with desires, being more interested in the questions of when we act and will freely.
However, if we already appeal to a notion of identification with desires, of their 'really
belonging' to an agent, to make sense of the cases of free action and will, it is difficult to see why
one would deny that we also identify with other sorts of affective mental states as well.
Returning to discussion of Frankfurt, the criterion Frankfurt famously first proposed for
an agent to be identified with a desire that this desire must be the object of one of their "second
order volitions".22 This means just that an agent must have a second order desire not only to have
this desire, but also to have this desire as their active desire, or, by Frankfurt's usage, their will,
in order to identify with it in the pertinent way. It is our second-order desires to take other desires
as our will, according to Frankfurt, which distinguishes us as persons and allow for us to act as
such.
As is well known, Gary Watson in his Free Action and Free Will quickly took issue with
this account of identification.23 His most fundamental criticism is that "we can see that the notion
of 'higher-order volition' is not really the fundamental notion for these purposes, by raising the
question, "[can't] one be a wanton, so to speak, with respect to one's second order desires and
21

See Jaworska’s Caring and Internality. (Jaworska, 2007)
Frankfurt, 1971, 10.
23
Watson, 1975.
22
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volitions?"24 Or, alternatively, as Irving Thalberg expresses the worry, "Why not go on to thirdstory or higher volitions?"25 It seems entirely arbitrary as to why our second-level volitions
should represent us, and not, say, our third or fourth.
To some extent, it seems Frankfurt anticipates this crucial objection even in his original
work, and he does later make fuller arguments with the aim of skirting this objection, to be
discussed shortly. Besides merely raising this objection however, Gary Watson in Watson, 1975
also argued for his own, radically different account of this sort of identification, on which we
identify instead through our evaluative judgment. As Watson helpfully puts it in discussing an
example case, "it is because [a kleptomaniac's] desires express themselves independently of his
evaluative judgments that we tend to think of his actions as unfree." 26
One reason why Watson's account is so notable, besides the fact that it occupies such an
early place in the literature, is that it is of a decidedly non-Humean bent. At the end of Free
Agency, Watson quotes Nietzsche as writing "Man's belly is the reason why man does not easily
take himself for a God."27 The meaning Watson intends to convey is clear: rather than in some
way constituting our identification with our psychic states and thereby our actions, as Frankfurt
claims it does, he means to suggest our affect only obstructs our free action instead.
If we appropriate this meaning to Nietzsche's aphorism, then we might take the ensuing
literature on identification as good evidence that he was incorrect. As Watson now
acknowledges, there exist what he has come to call "perverse cases", or cases in which one acts
contrary to their evaluative judgments of what it is best to do. "I might fully 'embrace' [and
24

Watson, 1975, 349.
See Thalberg's Hierarchical Analyses of Unfree Action. (Thalberg, 1978, 219)
26
Watson, 1975, 351. Such an (implicitly reluctant) kleptomaniac of course fills the same role in
Watson's argument as the unwilling addict did in Frankfurt's.
27
Watson, 1975, 251.
25
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identify with] a course of action I do not judge best; it may not be thought best, but is fun, or
thrilling; one loves doing it, and it's too bad it's not also the best thing to do, but one goes for it
without compunction."28 Even beyond identifying with desires and courses of action we do not
judge best, however, we can also even be alienated from our values themselves. As Velleman
observes, it is not difficult to imagine an individual recoiling from his own materialistic values. 29
While there have been no attempts to save Watson's 'rationalist' approach to free action as
far as I am aware, Frankfurt alone has on the other hand published a mass of literature on the
importance of higher order desires and also later care to our free agency, and others have done so
after him. Returning to Frankfurt's account, then, if we interpret Frankfurt in his 1971 work as I
have suggested, in the face of Watson's criticism the account he presents seems clearly lacking.
Frankfurt to a certain extent does, however, anticipate the arbitrariness objection originally raised
by Watson. What Frankfurt suggests near the end of this work to really be important to the issue
of identification with desires is that one must instead somehow actively desire a first order desire
such that "this commitment "resounds" throughout the potentially endless array of higher
orders."30 It is difficult to determine exactly what Frankfurt means here, and he himself in a later
work admits that the language in the few paragraphs in which he describes this solution is
"terribly obscure".31
In his more recent works Identification and Externality and Identification and
Wholeheartedness Frankfurt builds upon this earlier, rather oblique suggestion. 32 His comments
in the former of these two works, which is shorter and the earlier of the two, are more cautious,

28

Watson, 1987, 150.
See Velleman's What Happens When Someone Acts? (Velleman, 1992, 472)
30
Frankfurt, 1971, 16.
31
See Frankfurt's Identification and Wholeheartedness, page 167. (Frankfurt, 1987)
32
Frankfurt, 1976 and Frankfurt 1987.
29
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so I here discuss only his account as he presents it in Identification and Wholeheartedness. In
this later work, Frankfurt draws an analogy between the way in which we make decisive
identifications with desires and the way in which a mathematician may settle on a solution to a
mathematical problem:
Suppose [the mathematician] is confident that he knows the correct answer. He then
expects to get that answer each time he accurately performs a suitable calculation. In
this respect, the future is transparent to him, and his decision that a certain answer is
correct resounds endlessly in just this sense: It enables him to anticipate outcomes of an
indefinite number of possible further calculations. 33
Similarly to how a mathematician can become confident in the correctness of his
calculations after a point and decide that it would be pointless to check them further, persons can
be led to have a similar confidence in the fact that a first-order desire will meet with no challenge
further up the hierarchy. Although we cannot as 'finite beings' ever in our lifetimes consider all
of our nth-order desires as they may extend up the hierarchy, we can after a point 'cut off'
reflection and decide confidently enough that there is no conflict waiting for us further upwards.
Such a reflection-culminating decision is not arbitrary, according to Frankfurt, because at some
point in a series of reflections because the only reason one might continue to reflect would be to
deal with what they take to be a potential conflict; "[given] that the person does not have this
reason to continue, it is hardly arbitrary for him to stop."34
This account is vulnerable to a line of objection raised by John Christman is that it is not
difficult to imagine an individual being led to make a reflection-culminating decision which
doesn't seem to have any significance at all to their character. Take, as Christman does, the
example of an individual hypnotized to desire strawberries. If also hypnotized to ignore the

33
34

Franktfurt, 1987, 168.
Frankfurt, 1987, 169.
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hypnosis in their reasoning, then we can imagine such an individual decisively identifying with
these desires, yet we don't think that such a desire has any significance to his character, or that
his actions emerging from it are free in the sense under discussion. 35
While Frankfurt went on to propose further modulations of his original hierarchical
account,36 much of his later work on identification instead appeals to various notions of care, and
this line of approach has attracted significant interest. In what follows I discuss three prominent
accounts put forward by Harry Frankfurt, David Shoemaker, and Agenzia Jaworska in their
respective works. Structurally speaking, these accounts are very similar; they all hold that that
being identified with mental states is a matter of them being in some way constitutive of our
cares. Accordingly, when actions arise from desires with which we are identified, then we are
also identified with the action.
This shift in the literature was again precipitated by a work of Frankfurt's, specifically,
his The Importance of What We Care About.37 Although Frankfurt has since publishing this work
written extensively discussing different conceptions of care and its species love concerning their
roles in agency, I limit discussion to his earliest work on the subject here to avoid spending time
delineating the accounts Frankfurt has since developed.
Care, as Frankfurt characterizes it in Frankfurt, 1982, "is constituted by a complex set of
cognitive, affective, and volitional dispositions and states." 38 He claims that what a person cares
about "coincides in part with the notion of something with reference to which the person guides

35

The above is adapted from Christman’s Autonomy and Personal History. (Christman, 1991, 8-

9)
36

See for instance his The Faintest Passion. (Frankfurt, 1992)
Frankfurt, 1982.
38
Frankfurt, 1982, 85.
37
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himself in what he does with his life and in his conduct." 39 Although animals can certainly guide
themselves in their conduct in various ways, "[caring], insofar as it consists in guiding oneself
along a distinctive course or in a particular manner, presupposes both agency and self
consciousness."40 Additionally, on Frankfurt's conception of care "[a person who cares about
something] identifies himself with what he cares about in the sense that he makes himself
vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending on whether what he cares about is
diminished or enhanced."41 We might summarize that on Frankfurt's 1982 account, a care is a
collection of dispositions and mental states focused around the fortunes, positive and negative, of
certain entities, produced at least in part through some reflective process. On this picture of care,
it seems reasonable to take an individual to be identified with those desires which constitute their
cares.
David Shoemaker in his Caring, Identification, and Agency, similarly claims that
"identification is, for the most part, a passive process, garnering its authority for selfdetermination from one’s nexus of cares."42 Again in line with Frankfurt's conception,
Shoemaker holds what is most distinctive of caring is that "in caring for X, [one is] rendered
vulnerable to gains and losses—to emotional ups and downs—corresponding to the up-and-down
fortunes of X."43 While caring entails such emotional vulnerabilities, Shoemaker holds that the
connection in the other directions is just as strong; in his words, "[an] emotional reaction, in

39

Frankfurt, 1982, 82.
Frankfurt, 1982, 83.
41
Frankfurt, 1982, 83.
42
Shoemaker, 2003, 90.
43
Shoemaker, 2003, 91.
40
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other words, must be a reaction to events affecting something [we care about]; otherwise, it just
cannot be an emotional reaction."44
In association with these "emotional vulnerabilities", Shoemaker holds that "certain
dependent desires crop up, desires to act on behalf of the cared-for object, for example, to protect
it or contribute positively to its maintenance or development." 45 These desires are those we
identify with, and those which allow us to express our agency in action. To make this discussion
slightly more concrete, Shoemaker gives a helpful passage:
Consider first the relation between caring and emotional dispositions. Suppose I care a
great deal for my dog. Such caring will dispose me to a variety of affective states. For
example, when I come home from work and see his tail wagging and his mouth open in
what I take to be a smile, my affection for him will come rushing to the forefront
(producing dependent desires as a result: I will want to pet and play with him and give
him a treat for not tearing up the house while I was away). And when I see my dog
limping or listless, I will be distressed (wanting, as a result, to get him to the vet and fix
whatever the problem is). Indeed, caring requires such emotional vulnerability; I would,
after all, reject any attempt to block the feelings of distress attached to seeing my dog in
pain.46
On Shoemaker's picture we might summarize that cares are best understood as relations
individuals bear to various sorts of things around which emotional reactions and dependent
desires emerge tied to the affairs of these things emerge. What is more, it is only due to our cares
that mature adults have emotional reactions at all.
Yet more recently, Agniezka Jaworska in her Caring and Internality has developed an
account of care motivated by fact that individuals in what she terms 'marginal cases' don't
participate in reflective processes but still seem to be able to fully express their agency in their

44

Shoemaker, 2003, 93.
Shoemaker, 2003, 92.
46
Shoemaker, 2003, 92.
45
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actions and emotions.47 Young children and Alzheimer's patients, for instance, still seem able to
care about things and act in accordance with these cares, even though they seem not to assess
their stances towards the things they care about or the emotions involved with doing this
consciously.48 In order to accommodate these cases, Jaworska takes the relevant species of
caring to be, in psychological terms, a secondary emotion, or an emotion which involves
"conscious, deliberate considerations you entertain about a person or situation." 49 This is in
contrast to primary emotions, which include reactive responses such as fear and disgust and arise
in us without any sort of conscious processing.
Additionally, Jaworksa expands upon the notion of identification used in earlier
literature, claiming "[identification] is meant to track attitudes that "speak for the agent," that are
fully the agent's own and internal."50 This in a certain way synchronizes with her picture of cares
as "a structured compound of various less complex emotions, emotional predispositions, and also
desires, unfolding reliably over time in response to relevant circumstances." 51 Not only can we
identify with desires, according to Jaworksa, but also with a wide variety of other, careconstitutive-emotions, such as "grief, regret, hope, and so forth." 52 As I have expressed, this

47

Jaworksa, 2007.
If Jaworska is correct in this claim, which I take it she probably is, we might note two things.
First, many if not all of Frankfurt's earlier accounts which make some amount of reflective
activity necessary for identification face a strong objection to contend with. Second, the fact that
individuals with so little rational activity are capable of expressing themselves fully in these
ways provides strong evidence that something like caring, as opposed to, say, our judgmental
activity, is what allows us to identify with our actions and mental states. might be noted that
these cases provide strong evidence that something along the lines of caring is at the heart of the
issue of identification. I don't discuss either of these points any further in this paper.
49
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strikes me as correct; while the literature's initial focus was on free will and action, and desires
are the mental states most pertinent to these discussions, there is no reason why desires should be
the only mental states that we are capable of having as 'really our own.' Just as we can ask if
some individual desires freely, we can coherently ask, for instance, if they have one or another
attitude freely, or if it is merely 'passing by' or else is intruding.
3.1: Moral Attributability
Frankfurt's original goal in characterizing his technical notion of identification was to give the
conditions under which we act and will freely, or when our actions and desires are part of our
characters it in a way which distinguishes us as persons. As I have suggested, we ought to follow
Jaworska holding that this identification has a wider scope, and that we are capable of identifying
with other affective mental states53 than just desires. Conceived in this way, an additional
attractive point of an account of what an individual identifies with, though not the only one, is
that we can see it as providing an account of the mental states and actions an individual is
responsible for.
There are however many ways of attempting to get at what an agent is responsible for, 54
and one sort of responsibility I would now like to consider is moral attributability, first identified
by T. M. Scanlon in his "What We Owe to Each Other".55 To say that someone is responsible for
something in this sense is to say they are a viable target for a certain variety of aretaic appraisal
because of it; alternatively, as Scanlon himself puts it, it "is only to say that it is appropriate to
53
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clearer as the reader continues.
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take it as a basis of moral appraisal of that person."56 Following Scanlon, other writers have
taken an interest in the role of this sort of responsibility. Angela Smith, for instance in her
Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life discusses attributability as
... the conditions under which something can be attributed to a person in the way that is
required in order for it to be a basis for moral appraisal of that person. To say that a
person is responsible for something, in this sense, is only to say that she is open to
moral appraisal on account of it (where nothing is implied about what that appraisal, if
any, should be).57
I take it that Smith and Scanlon's conceptions of this notion are more or less the same.
What moral attributability concerns itself with is not whether some mental state or act 'belongs to
someone' as an agent in something like Frankfurt's sense, but instead whether under everyday
moral norms appraisals could be made of these individuals on the basis of these things, that is,
whether they would on the basis of these things be a proper target of such an appraisal, putting
aside what such an appraisal might be, or any practical consequences expressing it to them may
have.58
For the sake of contrasting these two sorts of responsibility, those implied by
identification and attributability, consider the case of an individual with deep-seated racist
tendencies which we might suppose they are not even aware of. This individual might, for
instance, desire not to hire individuals of a race other than their own, and this desire might
manifest itself in their behavior. They might at the same time insist earnestly if asked that they
are indifferent to the race of the individual they intend to hire. Certainly we feel such prejudiced
tendencies do render an individual an appropriate target for moral assessment. But it is at best
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unclear, on most of the accounts of identification we have considered, 59 whether this individual
is identified with such a desire.
Here is a more decisive case: consider an individual with the same desire against hiring
an individual of a different race, but one who is aware of this desire, alienated from it, and
actively attempts to avoid allowing it from influencing their actions. The higher-order desires
they have against having the prejudiced desire aside, such an individual is at any rate made a
proper target for moral assessment by having the prejudiced desire (their second order desire, we
might even plausibly assume, was born of their own moral assessment of themself). In this case,
not only is the prejudiced individual not identified with the prejudiced desire, but they in fact
seem alienated from it. This desire, however, is no less attributable to them despite this.
The two cases above both draw evidence that the conditions of identification are different
from those of moral attributability from the fact that we can and do in practice hold others
responsible in a very commonplace way for states and actions with which they are not identified.
I take it that they demonstrate this definitively. I doubt this point is novel, and I do not take
myself to be exposing any substantial problem, per se, for accounts of freedom which rely on the
notion of identification as the ones I have so far discussed do. I think we have an intuition,
though, that there is at least some sort of connection between those states we have as agents and
those actions and states which are morally attributable to us. Here is an argument to help make
this feeling more tangible: only of persons can the sort of aretaic appraisal involved in morally
attributing something to someone, one of them as a moral agent, be made. This suggests that the
preconditions of someone being an agent relative to their actions and mental states, should
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explain, if at least only partially, when they can have things attributable to themself in this way.
Put in other words, given accounts of free will and responsibility as attributability, it would be a
significant theoretical boon for each (and both, taken together) if it were the case that our
capacity for free action would be able to somehow explain our capacity for attributability.
With this said, the goal of this paper is to provide an account of attributability in terms
which are amenable to theories of free will, free action, and the free possession of mental states
which make appeal to a concept of care, for which we can explain our intuition that at least our
capacity for agency can explain our capacity for attributability. What I argue in the latter half of
this paper is that it is our desires constitutive of our cares (for a certain conception of care) which
make us responsible for our mental states or our lacks thereof. More precisely, I argue that
having a mental state or lack thereof attributable to oneself is a matter of having a careconstitutive desire for or against taking it. 60 While it would be desirable to also provide an
account of attributability for actions, their case is ostensibly more complex and space is limited
so I do not discuss the topic further here. In order to facilitate discussion of my own account and
to make some of the discussion contained herein about attributability more concrete, before
presenting my view I discuss and provide criticism of a recent competing account of moral

60

One might wonder: why not take a different approach, and say a mental state is attributable to
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attributability for mental states formulated by Angela Smith which locates the attributability of
our mental states to us in our evaluative judgments.
3.2: Attributability: Smith's Rational Relations View
In her paper Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life, Angela Smith
makes two interesting claims: (1) that we are often responsible for what she calls the 'patterns of
awareness' we display and fail to display and the attitudes we both take and fail to take, and (2)
that it is the rational connections these things bear to our evaluative judgments in such cases
which makes these things attributable to us.61
Smith draws upon compelling cases to support her claim that these sorts of mental states
or the lacks thereof are often attributable to us, and I agree with her on this matter. What Smith
calls our 'patterns of awareness' are, very broadly, “what we notice and neglect, what does and
does not occur to us, and what we see as relevant in our practical deliberations what either occurs
or fails to occur to us.”62 Her leading example is that of an individual who forgets a friend's
birthday.63 In such a case, it seems clear that one becomes open to a certain variety of criticism.
To give a few more of Smith's example cases: “If I do not notice when my music is too loud,
when my advice is unwelcome, or when my assistance might be helpful to others, these again
can be described as involuntary failings; nevertheless these failings are commonly taken to be an
appropriate basis for moral criticism.”64 More commonplace than her claim about patterns of
awareness are those involving the attitudes we take in our everyday lives. Although Smith
discusses these rather less, it is not hard to produce examples: when one is envious of the
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successes of a friend, takes racist attitudes, or is subject to certain vicious desires, for instance,
we feel as though that someone takes one of these attitudes is often equally legitimate grounds to
confront them as responsible for behavior.
On the rational relations view which Smith argues for, the attributability of the attitudes
and patterns of awareness we display is accounted for by two separate sorts of normative,
rational connections that these mental states have to our judgments. The attributability of patterns
of awareness to us is accounted for by rational connections they bear to the judgments we make.
The relevant norms in the case of patterns of awareness are I take it essentially those of practical
reason. If I judge someone a good friend, for instance, I should, rationally, think about them
enough to not forget to call them on their birthday. Separately, in order to account for the
attributability of our attitudes, Smith relies on the judgmentalist theory which holds that many of
our intentional mental states have judgments partially constitutive of them. Given such a theory,
the judgments partially constitutive of our attitudes will have the potential to conflict with those
we make more explicitly, and in such cases requests for justification can be made on the basis of
these conflicts. Smith thus models the attributability of attitudes on what she takes to be rational
conflicts such as the following:
If I sincerely judge that there is nothing dangerous or threatening about spiders, I should
not be fearful of them. The emotion of fear is conceptually linked to the judgment that
the thing feared is in some way dangerous or threatening; therefore, my judgment that
spiders are not in any way dangerous or threatening rationally entails that I should not
be fearful of them.65
What I take to be the largest problem with Smith's proposal is that it relies on the
controversial judgmentalist theory that judgments are constitutive of many of our attitudes.
Consider the case of an arachnophobe who is fully aware that their fear of common house spiders
65
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is entirely unwarranted. This individual might recoil from a house spider while at the same time
acknowledging it to be utterly harmless. But in such a case, it is clear what this individual judges
of the spider: it is completely harmless. If this is the case, then analyzing this and similar cases in
terms of conflicting judgments simply will not work.
To get a better grasp of the problem this presents for analyzing moral attributability, we
can again imagine the case of someone with racist tendencies, who can't help but see individuals
of races other than their own as, say, untrustworthy. They might be ready to earnestly assert that
their attitude has no basis in the character traits of these individuals and detest themselves for
being host to them, but nevertheless possess the racist attitude. While this attitude is morally
attributable to them, this circumstance simply does not seem properly frameable as one in which
judgments conflict, but something else altogether.
Smith admits that her account faces problems posed by "recalcitrant attitudes", and it is
conflicts such as the above, I take it, to which she is referring. 66 What exactly constitutes
judgments is a difficult question with much literature surrounding it, and I do not explore it in
any depth in this paper. While I think we plausibly do more often than not have associated
judgments alongside our attitudes, the above cases give strong evidence that this is not always
true. It is unclear to me how Smith should go about changing her account to remedy this
problem. The fact that judgments simply don't seem to be what is at the heart of these cases
suggests that this problem runs deep in her approach.
The problem more pertinent to the earlier discussion is, I take it, somewhat smaller. This
is that the literature on free will/action/mental state possession gives strong indication that it is
not our ability to make judgments, per se, which makes our acts and mental states belong to us as
66
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agents, but instead our cares. It may be the case that there is a strong argument, perhaps
proceeding from claims involving conceptual connections, that there is some link between caring
about things, which makes us persons with respect to our mental states and actions, and the
judgments which may make us responsible for our mental states. Or, it might turn out that
Watson was right all along, and it is judgment sensitivity which accounts for our agency with
respect to these things. But I see no strong reason to think that either of these states of affairs is
the case, and the literature on the issue to the contrary gives us good reason to think that it is our
cares, on some conception, though some dynamic, which allow for us to be agents relative to our
actions and mental states. In short, it is at best unclear on Smith’s theory how we can explain our
capacity for attributability in terms of our capacity for agency.
I do not think this second criticism is in any way definitive by itself. But when we weigh
accounts of phenomena against one another, unintuitive points in this vein do add up and make
the case for one view or the other stronger or weaker. In any case, if an account of moral
attributability were able to provide a clear account of this connection, we should think this an
advantage of it. This motivates an account of moral attributability as care sensitivity.
3.3: Further Motivating a Care-based Approach to Attributability: The Prototype
Account
While my goal, speaking broadly, is to argue that our cares which make things attributable to us,
considering first a similar, simpler but incorrect Humean view also helps motivate appealing to
care. Constructing and criticizing such a view is the goal of this section.
Attributability is at least plausibly a precondition of accountability. Being held to account
over something, or being 'held responsible' for it, seems to involve, among other things, an
aretaic appraisal, and being the proper subject of such an appraisal over something is just to have
24

it attributable to oneself. As a commonplace, being held to account involves a certain sort of
sting—it is unpleasant. As another commonplace, when our desires are frustrated, proportional to
the strength of the desire we experience a sort of affective penalty. These things together suggest,
even if only very obliquely, that when our attitudes or patterns of awareness are attributable to
us, it is at least often because we have a desire which our own conduct frustrates that can be
appealed to.
That we do take desires both for and against the mental states that we both have and
could have strikes me as another commonplace. While Smith gives many examples to
demonstrate that the attributability of mental states to us is closely tied to our judgments, it is not
difficult to repurpose her cases in a certain way to demonstrate the relevance of our higher-order
desires67 to these practices, often times more compellingly. I give discussion to four cases of the
attributability of attitudes and patterns of awareness or lacks of these things, suggesting that in
each case we can explain the attributability of some mental state or lack thereof to us through the
presence of higher-order desires.
Consider the case of two good friends who are employees at a company, Charles and
Eric. Whether through good fortune or hard work, suppose Charles gets a promotion. If they are
good enough friends, it is reasonable to expect that Eric will want to be happy for Charles in
light of his good fortune, to in a certain way affectively share in his success. Were he to fail to be
happy for him, we expect he would be receptive to criticism on the basis of this, and we can
explain this receptivity through a higher-order desire to feel good for Charles.
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Keeping with the same characters, Eric would also plausibly desire not to take certain
attitudes towards Charles on the basis of his success. While he would rather be happy for Eric in
the face of his successes, he would simultaneous be all the more troubled were he in such a
circumstance envious of him. This is just to say we expect that Eric would additionally not want
to be envious of Charles. Again, we expect he would be receptive of criticism on the basis of
having these attitudes and can explain this through the presence of desires against taking them.
We move on to the cases of patterns of awareness. To straightforwardly adapt one of
Smith's cases to this purpose, suppose Jenny has a good friend, Bill, whose birthday she's
forgotten.68 Upon realizing this, she would likely feel a certain degree of guilt for forgetting the
date, and experience it as a failure on her part that she didn't give Bill what she takes to be due
consideration. This experience of deficiency is explainable, at least in part, by the frustration of a
desire to at least be aware about considerations involving Bill in her reasoning.
Again using one of Smith's cases regarding objectionable attitudes, were it to occur to
Jerry that he might solve some problem in his life through committing or orchestrating some act
of violence, it would likely disturb him that such a thing would even cross his mind. 69 Even if
some experience of this sort of guilt is not immediate, upon reflection or being confronted over
the fact that he would consider such an action, such sentiments could likely be brought out. The
root of these sentiments, it seems most plausible, are in the fact that he to some degree does not
want such options to cross through his mind.
In each of these cases some individual experiences/is vulnerable to experiencing what
they take to be a failure on their part in having or failing to have certain mental state(s), and in
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each case we seem to be able to explain this experience of failure by the frustration of their
higher-order desires. Additionally, in each these cases the protagonist is intuitively responsible
for lacking or having the relevant mental states. This lends more plausibility to the idea that it is
our higher order desires for and against taking attitudes and patterns of awareness that make
these mental states (or lacks of mental states) attributable to us. According to what I will call the
prototype account, then, when we have a desire for or against having some attitude or pattern of
awareness, the mental state or lack of it, respectively, thereby becomes attributable to us.
At least two weaknesses present themselves for this view. The more substantial problem
is that it seems conceivable that one could cultivate within oneself a higher order desire that has
nothing to do with being responsible for anything. Suppose someone in an idle moment sees a
crumb in front of them. Unremarkably enough, they might come to have some weak desire to
flick it away. It also seems at any rate conceivable that they might, if they were so inclined, be
able to convince themselves to not only desire to flick away this crumb, but also to desire to
desire to do so. This certainly seems like an odd case, but I see no compelling reason to deny that
it is possible. If the prototype account is correct, then such an individual would have in their
everyday musing made themselves responsible for desiring to flick away the crumb. This of
course seems implausible.
The second worry is that even supposing the prototype account perfectly picks out every
instance in which one has some relevant sort of mental state attributable to them, it seems as
though it might fail to provide a complete enough explanation of why these mental states are
attributable to them. Suppose, then, that Fred notices Bill is angry at their mutual friend Eliza in
a way which strikes Fred as unfair to Eliza. Perhaps Eliza missed a gathering due to being called
in to work, and this has angered Bill. Motivated by this perceived injustice to Eliza, Fred might
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chastise Bill, "you really shouldn't be so angry with Eliza." Plausibly, Fred is trying to hold Bill
to account, or we might say ‘confront him as responsible’, in such a case. Suppose Bill admits,
trying to calm himself, you're right; I shouldn't." While it is plausible that this holding-to-account
might have been successful, this case is actually underdescribed. If the only reason Bill seems
receptive of this criticism is that his anger is getting in the way of him enjoying himself or else
doing his work, then he would plausibly have missed the message communicated to him by Fred
entirely. His attitudes toward Eliza are attributable to him according to the prototype view, as he
has a desire to be rid of them, but at the same time something has failed in this instance of
account. Plausibly, a more complete account of why similar states are attributable to us will be
able to explain at least more fully what happens in such a case.
3.4: Attributability as Sensitivity to Norms of Care-Constitutive Desires
The largest difficulty with the prototype account is that it maintains we have more mental states
attributable to us than actually are. If we wanted to amend instead of throwing out the prototype
account, the approach this suggests is finding a narrower collection of second-order desires
which make our mental states attributable to us. I propose that it is our care-constitutive desires,
for a certain account of care, which suited to fill this role. It may sound prima facie implausible
that to be responsible for a mental state we must have a care 'in the area' with an appropriate
desire constitutive of it. The conception of care that I claim can do this philosophical work I do
not propose as an account of care simpliciter, and I do not claim conforms to our every use of the
term. Judged as an account of care simpliciter, I expect it would fail. It promises to do good
philosophical work in explaining attributability, and this is what I take to justify exploring it.
Consider, then, some comments from Frankfurt's presentation Taking Ourselves
Seriously:
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When we do care about something, we go beyond wanting it. We want to go on wanting
it, at least until the goal has been reached. Thus, we feel it as a lapse on our part if we
neglect the desire, and we are disposed to take steps to refresh the desire if it should
tend to fade. The caring entails, in other words a commitment to the desire. 70
Frankfurt suggests here that caring about something involves desiring it in a certain way.
I take caring about something to involve a more complex collection of higher order desires than
Frankfurt might be taken to suggest here. Intuitively, when we care about something, not only do
we take desires toward other desires, but also toward an array of other mental states, including
attitudes and patterns of awareness. When we come to care about someone as we do when we
become good friends with them, to look back to multiple of the prior examples, not only do we
want to have desires to do certain things with or for them, but we desire not to be envious of
them, to be happy for them in their successes, and to involve their affairs in our reasoning more
than we would otherwise.
What is most important for the conception of care that I propose is that caring involves
taking a complex collection of desirative attitudes of a certain nature towards and against having
certain mental states. Besides these higher-order desires, the passage I initially took from
Frankfurt suggests that caring about something in his sense involves taking certain first order
desires centered around what we care about as well, and the other accounts of care I reviewed
earlier in this paper also suggest this. It is certainly the case that when we care about something,
we very often do have the lower-order attitudes/patterns of awareness, including first-order
desires, we take as the objects of these higher-order desires. Regardless, I do not treat them as
strictly necessary to our caring about something.
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Caring as these three authors characterize it also involves what we might describe as an
emotional investment in the affairs of the object cared about. Analogously to the discussion in
the above paragraph, while vulnerability to such sentiments often accompanies caring about
something, for caring as I characterize it the only emotional involvements required are higherorder ones, for and against taking certain mental states.
In principle, anything can be cared about. We can care about other people, fictional
characters, our relationships with other people, social justice, Nazism, that we drive safely, and
that the walls in some room be painted green. If Jerry cares about social justice, for instance, he
will plausibly desire to desire to see it implemented, desire to desire to help realize it, desire to
do away with any latent discriminatory tendencies he or others may have, and desire to consider
it when concerns related to it may be pertinent. Such a list could be extended.
The reader might demand a more detailed description of the complex of higher-order
desires involved in caring about something than has been given. That the objects of cares are so
diverse precludes giving too detailed of an account of precisely the variety of higher-order
desires involved in caring about something. While the authors herein discussed take emotional
investment in what happens to what is cared about as closely tied to caring about something,
what I instead take as characteristic of care is emotional investment in respectively manifesting
and not manifesting the lower-order mental states, which gives rise to desires for and against
taking them. What is necessary to caring as I conceive it are not first-order attitudes, but those
'one degree higher.' Caring involves taking desires (and corresponding emotional investments)
for and against taking lower-order mental states. While there may be some sort of expectability
relation which holds between caring about something and taking the relevant first-order mental
states, these lower-order states are not what is characteristic of care itself. I take it that this aspect
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of care makes the specialized use I am giving to the word differ rather markedly from that which
we commonly give it, but I again have no intent of capturing the notion simpliciter.71
The account of care I am presenting here I take to be essentially a modification of that
Shoemaker proposed in Caring, Identification, and Agency. In this work Shoemaker again takes
cares to be 'emotional tethers' to entities due to which all of our emotional reactions emerge, and
in accordance with which desires are produced. The two modifications I am making are
mandating that (1) care involves emotional investment in and the taking of higher-order desires
towards a wide array of affective mental states and (2) all that is necessary for care is the
presence of the emotional investments and higher-order desires mentioned in (1). I take past
examples to provide strong evidence that we do take higher-order desires towards and against
taking the sorts of mental states here under discussion, so the emotional investments and higher
order desires mentioned in (1) I take to be required by care on Shoemaker's account, though he
does not explicitly discuss them. The purpose of this second modification will be made clear in
my discussion of the second potential objection I consider in the following section.
As a concise statement one may hold me to, the view which I am here defending holds
that to have some mental state (or lack of such a state) attributable to oneself is to have one's
higher-order care-constitutive desires weigh in for or against manifesting the corresponding
mental state. Call this view the care account.
The care account skirts both of the issues initially raised for the prototype account
relatively straightforwardly. Firstly, even if one is capable of coming to have 'stray' higher-order
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desires, as one might come to have towards flicking a crumb, this will not be enough to make
one responsible for having the first order attitudes/patterns of awareness. Unless the higher order
attitudes we take emerge from our nexus of cares, they have no significance to the attributability
of any mental state. Related to this topic, Smith claims that "when certain slogans or song lyrics
keep running through one’s consciousness”, we are not responsible for such occurrences because
they do not depend on our judgmental activity. 72 The explanation I offer instead is that the lack
of attributability for our stray desires to flick crumbs or The Spice Girls being stuck in our head
arises from the fact that on the level of what we care about we are indifferent to these
occurrences. When our cares fail to weigh down for or against some mental state we are with
respect to these states little different from most animals; we might have desires and attitudes, but
we will lack any substantial conscience which makes us them attributable to us.
The second issue with the prototype account concerned its ability to provide a complete
enough explanation of what occurs when one individual confronts another as responsible.
Returning to the case of Fred chastising Bill for his anger at Eliza, the care account can explain
what went wrong. Fred most plausibly confronted Bill with an appeal to those attitudes
constituent of his caring about Eliza, rather than any belonging to a care he had for his own wellbeing or enjoyment. Bill, however, misinterpreted this appeal as one of the latter sort. This
suggests a partial account of what goes on in holding others to account: when we hold another to
account over their mental states, we do so on the basis of some certain care they have, not
merely the fact that they have higher order desires in general, without regard as to where these
desires emerge from.
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3.5: Objections
With the above, I have laid out the essential points of my account of attributability. Before
returning to some of my earlier claims concerning attributability and agency, I discuss two
objections to the account of responsibility-as-attributability I have provided in the care account.
Objection 1: As the existence conversationalist theories of responsibility evidence, when
we hold others responsible there is often the potential for a rich dialogue between the those
holding and held to account. If having something attributable to oneself is simply a matter of
caring about something, we should expect we would often not have the ability to engage in this
sort of exchange. Thus we ought be skeptical of the care account.
Response: Although it may not be obvious, our cares provide us with a rich basis for
both moral conversation. This is accommodated by the two facts. The first is that we are often
opaque to ourselves with regard to what we care about. The second is that we seem to care about
many things only instrumentally.
Suppose Todd accepts that he cares about everyone being treated fairly, but at the same
time professes to be indifferent to, say, issues of social justice. If confronted over his indifference
to some issue of social justice, he may thus not be immediately receptive of criticism. But we
might attempt to convince him that he should acknowledge his fault in such a case by either
attempting to convince him of something like a conceptual connection between social justice and
fairness, or else that what attitudes he takes in some instance aren't appropriate for one who cares
about fairness. There is plenty of room for moral discussion through such exchanges. What is
more, participating in such exchanges seems to me what we naturally tend to do when we meet
with difficulties in confronting someone as responsible.
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Objection 2: On the care account, we won't be able to hold many individuals responsible
for their attitudes who we believe we can. A devout racist, for instance, clearly does not at all
care about social justice or racial equality, yet we clearly can hold such an individual responsible
for their objectionable attitudes in the way which is relevant to attributability.
Response: This objection is liable to arise due to a particularly large tension between our
use of the word 'care' in everyday language and my specialized use. The accounts care we have
discussed in Frankfurt's, Shoemaker's, and Jaworska's works are undoubtedly closer to our
common usage in that they require us to be directly emotionally invested (in one way or another)
in the fate of what we care about. When we say someone cares about something in everyday
speech, what seems most centrally supposed is that this person has first-order desires of a certain
strength towards promoting whatever they see to be the good of what they care about.
Consistently with this, we often say that animals can care for their young or other members of
their social grouping.
In caring in the sense I have developed, strong ‘first-order’ desires or other attitudes need
not be present. Instead, a care might have little constitutive of it but relatively weak latent second
order desires which hardly manifest themselves at all in our lower-order mental states or actions.
This is so because it simply is the case that certain mental states or deficits thereof are often
attributable to people even in the absence of these strong first-order attitudes. While we can
imagine some petulant racist who takes highly objectionable attitudes without being at all
reflective on them, my impression is such individuals are rarely beyond caring. It is difficult to
support such generalizations, e.g., that most racists care about racial equality, but similar
generalizations have had a certain amount of support in the past. The most notable example will
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be Hume's claim that "[w]hatever conduct gains my approbation, by touching my humanity
procures also the applause of all mankind, by affecting the same principle in them." 73
Besides historical support, there is an analogous case which makes this claim seem highly
plausible. Suppose you are eating a hamburger, and in doing so attract the attention of a devout,
exceptionally pushy vegetarian. She might rail against you, claiming that your ability to order
and eat food the production of which involves the inhumane treatment and slaughter of other
sentient creatures without a second thought is disturbing. Plausibly contained in such a tonguelashing is an appeal to your cares. If I had to wager, the reader has had at multiple points in their
life feelings very similar to those the devout vegetarian is attempting to inspire, and have felt the
associated pangs of guilt, yet, statistically speaking, the reader is no vegetarian. Essentially all of
us care about other sentient life and are unsettled by such a rebuke. At the same time, most of us
manage to get by without experiencing such feelings when we order hamburgers.
The above is a powerful testament to the fact that human beings have a rather disturbing
capacity to ignore their second-order desires, their conscience, when it is expedient for them. In
light of this and similar cases, it seems very plausible to me that virtually all racists and
individuals in like cases are to some degree susceptible to being appealed to on the basis of their
cares, and this is all that the theory I propose requires. In the event that in some case someone is
completely indifferent, on the level of their cares, to the objectionable mental states they as a
matter of fact have, whatever they are, then they are beyond being responsible for them. But such
individuals are so exceptional that we ought to think that this is the correct conclusion in such
cases; with respect to these mental states, they are not unlike most animals.

73

Hume, "An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals", 76.
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4.1: Autonomy, Attributability, and Account
With these objections addressed, I now return to my original claim, that this account of
attributability in terms of our cares will plausibly be able to give an account of the connection
between our abilities to take actions, will, and have mental states as agents and have mental
states attributable to us. If we consider care as I have suggested, then identifying with mental
states might be most intuitively construed as a matter of having desires constitutive of care weigh
in toward having a mental state. But this will not be enough. Care as I have construed it, in order
to avoid the second objection posed above, need not involve actually having the mental states
which are the objects of our care-constitutive higher-order desires. One cannot have a mental
state freely if one does not, in the first place, have the relevant mental state. The simple solution
which this suggests and which I take is that we identify with mental states as agents just when we
(1) have the mental state and (2) have care-constitutive desire(s) toward having the relevant
mental state.
Strictly speaking if this proposal is correct then it will be that an individual can have
states attributable to them without identifying with any mental states at all, although such an
occurrence, we should expect, would be a rarity. The most easily imaginable case would be an
individual that only cares about one thing but doesn't have any of the first-order mental states
they desire to take. Although one may not have the first-order mental states which their careconstitutive desires demand they do, and thus may not be identified with any of their mental
states, the ability to have mental states attributed to oneself is explained by those states which
give us the capacity to identify with these states.
The goal of this paper is to argue such an account of attributability which meshes with the
literature on freedom in this way is plausible. As I prefaced this project, I do not intend to argue
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that this account of identification is capable of doing the work of characterizing when we act and
take mental states in the agent-specific way which the literature in this vein attempts to. Still, one
reason that we should think this account of identification or perhaps one very similar should be
able to fill this role is that I take it to be essentially an extension of Shoemaker's account of
identification. The principle differences are that it (1) follows Jaworska in taking identification to
be a wider-ranging phenomenon which can hold between persons and different types of mental
states and (2) holds that second order desires and associated emotional investments are required
for identification with these mental states. These qualifications do not strike me as at all
objectionable. In fact, I see no reason why anyone should take identification to be a phenomenon
restricted only to desires and actions and think that Shoemaker's own view probably entails that
second order desires of this sort are required for identification, given the nature of the emotional
connections that caring on his view requires. Shoemaker however doesn't speak on either of
these points, so I am cautious about attributing this view fully to him.
I take it this parity between my account of attributability and having these mental states
as agents as highly desirable. In closing I would like to remark on two interesting results which
fall out of it. This view suggests a picture of the process by which we hold others responsible for
mental states, or account, as a distinctively interpersonal manner of communication. When we
hold others to account, we engage with them as a being with the capacity for conscience and
agency—we make appeals to their care-constitutive desires, appeals to them as an agent to take
the mental states they might identify with to be of a character 74 more consistent with their cares.
When we fail to do this, or when we merely attempt to make deals with others or threaten to
harm or sanction them, we fail to engage with them in this distinctively interpersonal way.
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I use the word in a loose, non-technical sense here.
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This is not to say that when hold others to account we are in every case doing so with the
express intent of having them realize their cares. Nor is it to say that when we do so threats or
sanctions are never present. They generally are; when we are moved to take reactive attitudes,
this is generally75 because something or someone we are emotionally invested in has been
harmed or stands to be harmed. Very often, our desires to protect or avenge what we care about
are simply strong enough that we are willing to bargain with or impose various costs on others to
do so, whether we can justify this by some practice-external stance or not. But if all there is in
some instance is an attempt to bargain with a person or sanction or threaten them, then one fails
to hold such an individual to account, to interact with them as a person, but instead only 'takes
account' of them as an obstacle to their goals, as one might most animals.
This is by no means a complete picture of account and accountability, but it yields
another compelling result. While there is often some threat of sanctions contained in instances in
which we hold others to account, this is not true in all cases, and the care view accommodates
this. Consider what Lawrence Stern says when he claims that:
[King and Gandhi] publicly rebuked others for doing wrong. We have every reason to
believe that the rebuke was the sincere expression of a sentiment. Therefore, in some
important sense they blamed others for wrongdoing. Yet it is not clear that they wished
those they blamed to suffer. Nor did they exclude them from the moral community. For
their method of action was to appeal to the conscience of their adversaries. 76
At least as regards our mental states, appealing to someone's care-constitutive desires is
not so different from appealing to their conscience. While Stern uses the examples of these men
to point towards a distinction between moral approbation and moral indignation, they also
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And we might note if Shoemaker is correct in claiming that adult emotional reactions are in all
cases care-constitutive, plausibly always.
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See Lawrence Stern's Freedom, Blame, and Moral Community. (Stern, 1974)
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provide strong evidence that holding someone to account need not involve much more than an
appeal to care.
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